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F
ree competition between companies in  providing goods and services, whether 
in the public or private sector, guarantees a wide choice for consumers and 
helps to keep prices down and quality standards high. It also provides a powerful 
stimulus to technological and economic progress, since competing companies are 
constantly forced  to innovate.1  But free  competition is  not incompatible with  a 
degree  of public  control, for  a  number of reasons: 
D  Left  entirely  to  the  free  play of market forces,  competition can degenerate. 
Companies may try to cheat by entering into risk-sharing agreements. Compe-
tition  can  destroy  itself if economic  concentration  leads  to  the  creation of 
monopolies.  To  counter  these  dangers,  many  countries  have· passed  laws 
enabling them to inter:vene where faire and effective competition is threatened. 
D The free  play of market forces does not always further key economic policies, 
such as  the  rapid development of new technologies and the rationalization of 
.  struggling industries  .. It can also disrupt social policies, such as efforts to solve 
the  problems  caused  by  rationalization  and  the  reduction  of regional  im-
balances. In  these cases, public  aid  is  justified, at least for  a limited period. 
Why a  European policy? 
Alongside  these  national  policies,  there  is  scope  for  a  European. competition 
policy. The creation of the European Community has opened up a vast market of 
more than 270 million <;onsumers  within which goods and services are supposed 
to circulate freely. New barriers must not be allowed to spring up to threaten the 
unity of this market. The objectives of European comp0tition policy are therefore: 
D To prevent companies from re-establishing, by means of  market-sharing agree-
ments  and  export  bans, less  visible  but equally effective barriers to trade to 
replace the customs frontiers  abolished by the  Community.  Both consumers 
and traders benefit from this policy: consumers because they can take advan-
tage  of the  lowest  prices  available  in  any of the  member countries; traders 
because they  are given  access to  a market on  a  European scale. 
D  To  prevent excessive  concentrations of economic  power from  damaging the 
interests of consumers, competitors or subsidiaries. Fair competition· and free 
movement  of goods  are  protected  by  preventing  companies  from  abusing 
dominant  market  positions  and  preventing  the  concentration  of economic 
decision-making  in  too few  hands, especially  in  the coal  and  steel  sector. 
D To prevent national aids from giving  unfair advantages or distorting competi-
tion in such a way that economic forces are disturbed and the very existence of 
the common market is  threatened. 
1  This  file  updates  and  replaces  our  No  2/83. 
~-3 The recession has not caused Community countries to question these fundamental 
objectives. But the social implications of the economic crisis have forced govern-
ments to re-examine carefully the advantages and disadvantages of restrictions on 
free  competition.  Care is  needed. 
Each country realizes the dangers to its own exporting industries if its neighbours 
increase government aids or companies erect new barriers to trade. For each job 
saved  in  one  place  in  the  short term,  how  many more  will  be  placed  at risk 
elsewhere in the long term in a world where trade is geared to the laws of the free 
market? 
European competition policy is  set out in  broad terms in the Treaties governing 
the Community.1  Equality of economic opportunity is  guaranteed to all  compa-
nies  in  the Community by  an impartial body which  monitors the  market and, 
occasionally, punishes offenders: 
0  This central role in the enforcement of Community competition law is  played 
by the European Commission, acting either on its own initiative of  following up 
complaints  from  Member  States, companies  or individuals.  The cases dealt 
with  run into  thousands.  In many instances they  are resolved  by voluntary 
policy changes by the countries or companies concerned (a celebrated example 
is  the  IBM  case,  where  the  company  was  accused  in  1980  of abusing  a 
dominant position and fmally  reached a voluntary agreement with the Com-
mission in  1984). In other cases, the Commission finds in favour of the accused 
or it  fmds  the  case  proved,  and  orders  policy  changes  or  impose~ fines, 
sometimes  running  to  millions  of ECU.2  Companies have  a right of appeal 
against Commission decisions to the European Court of Justice and a consid-
erable  body of case-law  has  been  established. 
D  Businesses  and individuals who  believe  themselves to be  victims  of infringe-
ments  of Community competition ·rules  can also  bring  direct actions before 
national courts. 
Company agreements 
The European Treaties ban as incompatible with the common market 'all agree-
ments  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted practices which  may affect trade between  Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion  within  the  common market.' 
This blanket ban on agreements applies to European and non-European compa-
nies,  private. and  public  enterprises  alike.  Since  1962,  agreements  likely  to fall 
1  With some exceptions, this text omits specific, but broadly equivalent, measures for the coal and 
steel industry covered by  the Treaty of Paris. 
2  One ECU (European currency unit) = about £ 0.62, lr. £ 0. 72  or US $ 0.69 (at exchange rates 
current on 8  February 1985). 
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under the ban must be notified in advance to the European Commission. Compa-
nies can apply for 'negative clearance', which  means that free competition is not 
threatened, or an 'exemption', sparing a restrictive agreement from the overall ban 
because of the benefits  it  brings. 
The Commission is  empowered to declare illegal and order the termination of an 
agreement or other unacceptable practices at any time.  For more than 20 years, 
the Commission has been called upon to deal with many forms of agreements and 
concerted  practices:  ·  · 
D Market sharing agreements, which create protected markets, often in  a single 
Member State. Among the numerous cases of 'each to his own' dealt with and 
banned by the Commission were the quinine cartel, which Jed the Commission 
to impose its first  fmes  in  1969, the sugar producers cartel (1973) and more 
recently,  in  1984,  the cartels of zinc  and  flat  glass manufacturers, who were 
fined  a total of 4  million  EC U. 
· D Pricefixing agreements such as the dye-stuffs cartel (1969), which controlled 
80%  of the  European  market.  The  manufacturers  had  agreed to  raise  their 
prices by the same amount at virtually the same time. This was the first case in 
which firms with head offices outside the Community were fined because they 
were  operating within  the  Community in  a damaging  way. 
D Exclusive  purchase  agreements  involving  arrangements  to  buy  only  from 
specified  manufacturers  or importers  or  exclusive  supply  agreements  to  sell 
only  to  certain  buyers.  Such  agreements,  which  have  occurred  in  markets 
ranging  from  gramophone records to heating equipment, are outlawed by the 
European Commission. They carve up the market and give  unfair advantages 
which  distort free  trade. 
D Agreements on  industrial and commercial property rights: the exclusive use of 
patents, trade marks or works of art is not necessarily exempted from competi~ 
tion rules. In one case in  1982, involving maize seed, the Court of Justice ruled 
against the total territorial protection granted by  a patent licensing contract. 
D Exclusive or selective distribution agreements: in  1964 the European Commis-
sion  ruled against an agreement which granted the distributor Consten exclu-
sive rights to ·handle  Grundig products in  Fran·ce. The Commission's opposi-
tion to any form  of restriction of ·parallel imports has been demonstrated in a 
number of rulings. In 1981, for instance, the Commission imposed a heavy fine 
on the Moet-Hennessy champagne group because its British subsidiary banned 
UK traders from re-exporting its products. Selective distribution arrangements 
are sometimes permitted if they improve the quality of the service provided (see 
for instance the 'IBM-personal computer' ruling  of 1984). But discrimination 
against retailers, especially for their pricing policies, can be severely punished, 
as in  the  1982 case of AEG-Telefunken. 
5 European competition policy must not, however, be  seen  as purely negative. It 
also  encourages  positive· developments.  Economic  and  social  progress  often 
comes  about through  various  forms  of cooperation  between  companies;  The 
Commission attempts to promote these  through  its  powers to authorize agree-
ments which, in the words of the Treaties, 'contribute to improving the production 
or distribution of goods or promoting technical or economic progress ... without 
imposing on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable 
to the attainment of these objectives (and without) affording such undertakings 
the possibility of eliminating competition in  respect of a  substantial part of the 
products in  question.' 
On  this  basis  the European Commission  has taken  a  number of decisions  of 
principle  to waive  the  requirement to  notify  company agreements. It has also 
given  bloc  -authorization  to  certain  agreements,  provided  that  a  number  of 
conditions are ·fulfJJ.Ied.  These include distribution and purchasing agreements as 
well  as specialized manufacturing agreements up to a fiXed  level of turnover and 
market share. Another exemption guarantees the legal standing of  certain kinds of 
patent licensing contracts. Research and development agreements will  from now 
on  be  given  a  similar  dispensation,  along  with  motor vehicle  distribution  and 
before  and after-sales  servicing agreements. 
The  Commission  is  particularly  interested  in  cooperation  between  small  and 
medium-sized enterprises, which often further econ·omic progress. It has therefore 
identified a number of  types of agreement which it feels should escape the general 
ban: 
D  Exclusive representations contracts given  to trade representatives; 
D  Small-scale  agreements,  based on turnover (not more than 50 million  ECU) 
and market share (not more than 5%); 
D  Subcontracting agreements; 
D  Information exchanges between companies, joint studies and joint use of plant. 
In addition to these rulings, some of which have been brought up to date recently, 
the  European Commission gives  careful  consideration to the  economic climate 
facing companies seeking individual exemptions from the ban on agreements. If, 
for  example,  there  is  a  long-term  downturn  in  demand  for  a  product,  the 
Commission  can, under certain circumstances, authorize firms  to  coordinate a 
rundown  in  overcapacity. A  recent  example  was  the  synthetic  fibres  sector in 
1984. 
Mergers and abuse of dominant positions 
The current restructuring of the crisis-hit steel industry is  a useful iUustration of 
the  way the  Commission  takes  account of economic  facts  of life  in  applying 
6 
I 
I The  concentration  of  Community  manufacturing  industry,  1975-1982 
Percentage  share  of  the  25,  50,  100.  200  and  400  largest  companies  in: 
industrial  employment 
lili!f.lttttttll------11---400 
1975  1982 
Source:  Eurlipean  Commission,  141h  raporl  on  competition  policy,  using  statistics  from  Eurostat  and  the  'Nouvel 
~conomiste'. 
7 competition law.  In this sector, as with the coal industry, mergers and takeovers 
must receive prior authorization from the Commission. To protect the indepen-
dence of the different groups, the Commission seeks  to prevent individuals from 
taking up seats in  a number of boardrooms where they might be in a position to 
monitor the policies of competing groupes and coordinate supposedly independent 
commercial and industrial decisions. Recent large-scale mergers authorized by the 
Commission are consistent with the anti-crisis and restructuring policy agreed by 
the  Community.  They  are  expected to lead to increased  competitiveness  and  a 
better  balance of supply  and  demand  on  the  steel  market. 
The European Treaties make· no provision for  control of mergers in sectors other 
than  coal  and  steel.  The  Commission  did  however  propose to  the  Council  of 
Ministers  in  1973,  and  in  modified  form  in  1981  and  again  in  1984,  that the 
largest mergers should be made subject to Commission scrutiny. The Commission 
also sought the power to ban mergers which, in its view, pose a threat to effective 
competition in  the  Community. 
While  waiting  for  Council  decisions  on  these  points,  the  Commission  is  not 
entirely powerless. The Treaties state that 'any abuse by one or more undertak-
ings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of 
it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States'. The application of these Treaty provisions 
to  industrial mergers  began  in  1971-73  with  the  Continental  Can case.  In  this 
instance, the European Court of Justice acquitted the giant American packaging 
company but ruled that certain mergers could of  themselves constitute an abuse of 
dominant position. 
Unfair  pricing,  curbs  on  production  or marketing  and· discrimination  between 
traders are other examples of punishable abuse by companies of  market positions. 
Two  instances can be  quoted.  The  first  is  the  1978  ruling  against  the  United 
Brands Company, confirmed by the European Court. This company was judged 
to  have  interfered  with  the  market  by  ordering  its  distributors  not  to  re-sell 
bananas while  still  in  their green phase. It was  also found to have blacklisted a 
customer who took part in an advertising campaign for  a competing product. A 
second  example  is  the  1981  judgement  agains  Neder1andse  Banden-Industrie 
Michelin  for  offering  discounts to  discourage  tyre  retailers  from  buying  other 
makes. 
State ovvnership 
European competition policy also safeguards Community rules by watching over 
the activities  of State-owned enterprises: 
0  In 1962 there were 18 national trading monopolies in the Community, covering 
goods  ranging  from  potassium,  gunpowder  and  explosives  to  alcohol  and 
tobacco.  Partly by  negotiation and partly by taking recalcitrant offenders to 
8 the  European  Court,  the  Commission  has  often  managed  to  enforce  the 
objectives  of the  Treaty,  namely  the  abolition  of discrimination  between 
nationals of the  Member States in  the procurement and marketing of goods. 
Despite recent advances, minor problems remain, notably in the marketing of 
tobacco in France and Italy. In Greece, which joined the Community in  1981, 
the  dismantling of State monopolies  has  yet to  be completed. 
D As far  as  public or private ownership is concerned, the European Treaties are 
completely neutral. State-owned concerns must respect Community law, par-
ticularly competition law, in  the  same way as any privately-owned company. 
Consequently,  the  Commission  drew  up  a  directive  in  1980  to  ensure  the 
financial  'transparency' of dealings  between Member States and State-owned 
concerns.  In  the  first  place,  this  measure  will  apply  to .  the  car  industry, 
synthetic  fibres,  textile  machinery' shipyards  and  tobacco manufacturing. 
State aid 
A  further  problem  is  State  aid,  whether  to  private  or  public  enterprises.  The 
European Treaties declare such aids incompatible with the common market in so 
far as they distort trade between Member States or damage competing firms. But 
certain forms  of social aid  are permitted. Exemptions are also  made for clearly-
defined and limited aids to the regions or industrial sectors which  aim to correct 
regional  imbalances or permit struggling  sectors  to readapt: 
D  Regional aid  aims  to  improve the balance of economic development through-
out the Community. To prevent distortions of competition and check damag-
ing  competition in the level of investment aid, the European Commission laid 
down  common  guidelines  in  1975  (strengthened  in  1979)  which  establish, 
amongst  other  things, ceilings  for  aid  within  the Community. 
D  Environmental  aid  is  regulated  by  Community guidelines  which  ensure  that 
national  policy  does  not  stray far  from  the principle of the 'polluter pays'. 
D Aids to struggling industrial sectors have mushroomed. The Commission takes 
account of the  economic crisis  in  laying down guidelines.  It insists that such 
aids  must  be  exceptional,  limited  in  duration  and  geared  directly  to  the 
objective  of restoring  long-term  viability  by  reducing  capacity  in  struggling 
sectors.  More  detailed  guidelines  exist for  four  sectors: 
•  Shipbuilding  aids  are  controlled  by  a  fifth  directive,  agreed  in  1981  and 
recently  extended  to  1986; 
•  Textiles  are  subject to a  framework  for  aids, first  drawn up in  1971  and 
made  more  specific in  1976; 
•  Synthetic  fibres; 
9 •  Steel, which is the subject of a  1981  agreement allowing limited aids up to 
the  end  of 1985. 
General aids, introduced to meet a variety of objectives, also tend to multiply in 
time of crisis. They can create numerous distortions. Investors can, for instance, 
be  attracted to settle  in  one  member country rather  than another.  General aid 
must be submitted for Commission approval. The Commission attempts to weed 
out elements likely to cause too marked a distortion in competition. Certain forms 
of aid  can, however, be acceptable, if they pursue objectives of common interest, 
such as research, energy-saving or job-creation. They are also expected to form 
part of an industrial or regional aid programme with distinct objectives, conform-
ing  to Community priorities. The most far-reaching  plans must be submitted to 
the Commission for  prior approval.1 
European competition policy has a dual objective: to prevent Member States from 
distorting  competition  by  giving  favoured  treatment  to  certain  enterprises;  to 
prevent firms  from  carving  up  markets  by  erecting  new  barriers to  trade.  The 
policy  aims  to  defend  the  interests  of the  consumer  and,  in  the  long  run,  to 
guarantee dynamism  in  the European economy  •  · 
1  For more  details,  see European File,  No 9/82: 'The Community  and  State  aids  to  industry'. 
10 The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the official views of the 
institutions of the  Community.  Reproduction  authorized. 
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